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On December 11, 1992, the Chicago Board of Trade began trading
the first futures contract tailored specifically for the insurance
industry. This contract, termed Catastrophe Insurance Futures, is
intended to serve as a new form of risk shifting for the insurance
industry and a low cost alternative to reinsurance.
The insurance industry, however, has barely participated in
the Catastrophe Insurance Futures market. The reluctance to trade
Catastrophe Futures can be blamed partly on regulatory restrictions
and, perhaps, the structure of the contract. But another important
reason for low participation by insurers in the Catastrophe Futures
market is a lack of understanding of how futures work in general
and how the Catastrophe Futures contract works in particular.
This article explains the new contract to insurance
practitioners. It also shows how futures markets can be a useful
tool for insurance companies to manage total financial risk.
Futures
The term futures applies to a standardized form of economic
transaction in which the commitment to engage in an exchange is
made at a time significantly before the transaction is completed.
Many kinds of financial commitments are made well ahead of the time
the exchange is made. A househunter may commit to purchase a house
at a given price three months later. A car dealer may agree to
deliver a particular type of vehicle at a predetermined price on
some later date. A contractor may agree to perform a certain task
by a particular completion date. All these examples illustrate
commitments to future economic transactions, but they are not
considered futures contracts.
Two special features distinguish a futures contract from other
forms of commitments to trade at a later date. First , the contract
is standardized as to exactly what is being traded and when and
where the delivery will occur. Wheat futures, for example,
indicate the classification and type of the wheat to be traded,
such as #2 Hard Red Winter Wheat, and the location where delivery
will be made. By having a limited number of standard contracts,
rather than allowing each pair of traders to engage in a different
type of transaction, the trading of futures is simplified and
trading in each of the contracts is increased.
The second distinguishing feature of a futures contract is
that it involves three parties to the transaction. An
intermediary, the futures exchange, participates in every futures
contract. The exchange stands in the middle as a guarantor to
every contract issued. In fact, neither side of the contract needs
to know the identity of the other side, since the exchange stands
ready to uphold the contract if either party defaults.
These two special features make futures contracts extremely
liquid, meaning that it is easy to buy or sell these contracts.
Buyers and sellers can readjust their holdings quickly and
inexpensively. In fact, most traders in futures do not intend to
deliver or take delivery of the item covered by the futures
contract. Sometime after the initial trade and prior to the
delivery date, the trader reverses the initial transaction. Thus,
a trader that initially bought a futures contract would later sell
a similar contract, essentially negating the first trade and
gaining protection against further price changes. The reasons that
a trader would buy a futures contract without intending to hold it
until expiration are either:
1) to profit from an expected change in price of
the futures contract (speculator)
or 2) to reduce total operating risk of an organization by
taking a position in futures that is expected to move
inversely with some factor that affects profitability in
general (hedger)
History and Examples
The Chicago Board of Trade, the futures exchange that
introduced catastrophe insurance futures, is the oldest and one of
the largest of the futures exchanges in the United States. They
have been in operation since 1842. The first futures were based on
agricultural commodities and these remain the easiest basis for
understanding how futures markets function. However, futures
contracts are now traded which are based on metals, petroleum
products, and financial assets, in addition to agricultural
commodities.
When the buyer and seller of a futures contract enter into the
agreement, no money changes hands. A buyer does not make a payment
to the seller in exchange for the commitment of the seller to
deliver a commodity at some later date for a set price. (This type
of transaction would be similar to an option, rather than a
future.) Instead, the buyer and seller agree upon a price, to be
paid in the future, at which the transaction will take place. Both
buyer and seller post a deposit, termed a margin, with its broker
so the futures exchange is assured that the transaction can be
completed. Only after the futures contract is made does money
begin to change hands. If the consensus price of the futures
contract, as represented by the price established by later trades
by other participants, shifts from the one agreed to by the initial
buyer and seller, then funds are drawn down from the account of the
side adversely affected and paid to the account of the other side
of the transaction. This transaction is called marking to market.
For example, if a buyer and seller agreed to trade 5,000
bushels of corn in July, 1994, for $2.53 per bushel, each would
post a margin (of, for instance, $1,265) with its broker. This
represents a trade of one futures contract for corn. As long as
July 1994 corn futures continued to trade at $2.53, nothing further
would happen. However, if the price on these futures increased 7
cents to $2.60 per bushel, then the seller would have its account
debited by $350 (.07 times 5000), and the buyer would have that
amount credited to its account. If, while the July 1994 corn
futures are still trading at $2.60 per bushel, the buyer then
closed out its position by selling one July 1994 corn futures at
the $2.60 per bushel price then, again, no money would change hands
due to the futures transaction. This trader would not be subject
to any further price risk and would have realized a gain of $350 on
the transaction, with the gain occurring when the futures price
changed. The buyer in this case may have been a speculator,
anticipating, correctly in this instance, a price increase in corn
futures. Or the buyer may have been a hedger, concerned about the
adverse impact of a price increase in corn on other operations. A
bakery or cereal company would be in this position. In this case,
the adverse impact of the increase in corn prices is offset by the
financial gain on the futures contract.
Interest Rate Futures
One of the most useful types of futures contracts for insurers
is the interest rate future. Interest rate futures are similar to
agricultural futures in that they lock in a price for purchase or
sale at a later date. Rather than fixing a price for wheat, an
interest rate future fixes the price of a standardized fixed income
security. Locking in the price at which one can buy or sell a
bond, of course, locks in the lending or borrowing rate at that
future date.
The two most popular interest rate futures contracts are based
on Treasury bonds and on 90-day Eurodollar CDs. The Treasury bond
contract, traded at the Chicago Board of Trade, represents long-
term interest rates. The Eurodollar contract, traded at the
Chicago Mercantile Exchange, represents the shorter end of the
yield curve. Though other interest rate futures trade, most users
prefer these two contracts because of their superior liquidity.
Futures can be used as substitutes for a purchase or sale of
an actual bond. Though they come only in standardized maturities
and quantities, they are very cheap to buy or sell, both because of
the high liquidity of the futures market and because the margin
requirements are low. Buying a T-Bond future can be a substitute
for the purchase of a bond; selling a futures contract can
substitute for the sale of a bond.
If a portfolio manager knows that he will have more funds to
invest soon and is concerned that interest rates may fall, he can
buy bond futures now to lock in the current rate. Then, when he
gets the funds to invest, he can close out the futures position and
buy the actual bonds. If interest rates have fallen, his bond
futures position will show a profit. This should then offset the
higher price he will have to pay for the actual bonds. The results
should be the same as though he invested the funds at the old,
higher interest rate. If interest rates rise, then he will incur
a loss on the futures contract which will be offset by higher
investment income. Once again, the net result will be the same as
though the funds were invested at the original interest rate. This
strategy is known as a long hedge.
As you can see from the example above, the proper futures
position can improve overall performance, but may substantially
alter cash flows. At times, this is an advantage. Insurers
generally prefer not to sell bonds that have fallen in value, since
this reduces statutory surplus and thus limits their ability to
write premiums. If rates are expected to increase, a sale of the
bond itself would protect a manager from a loss. However, selling
the bond might mean taking a substantial capital loss. By selling
a bond future instead, a manager can receive the same economic
result without taking an accounting loss. After the short position
in bond futures has been taken, an increase in interest rates still
results in a loss on the bond portfolio, but this is now offset by
a gain on the short futures position. This strategy is known as a
short hedge.
Since interest rate futures are based on a standardized bond,
the value of the manager's bond portfolio and futures prices may
not move exactly together. This may mean that the losses and gains
from the either of two strategies detailed above may not exactly
balance out. If the prices of the bonds in the manager's portfolio
move down by more than the standardized bond on which the futures
contract is based, the manager will be faced with a net loss.
However, the net loss will be much lower than if he hadn't hedged,
due to the gain from the futures position.
The exact number of futures to buy or sell in either of the
strategies described above is not obvious. There are several
approaches to determine the proper hedging strategy. One approach,
the simplest, calls for a futures position which represents the
same total face value as the actual bond position which the manager
wishes to hedge. Each Treasury bond futures contract represents
$100,000 of face value. A second approach decreases the futures
position to allow for the fact that the standardized futures bond
and the actual bond portfolio are less than perfectly correlated.
The decrease is greater the less closely the value of the hedged
portfolio moves with the futures price, with the correlation
measured historically. A third approach is based on duration
measures: the bond portfolio may be immunized by matching the
duration of the futures position to the duration of the manager's
bond portfolio.
Financial institutions such as banks, life insurance
companies, mutual funds, and pension funds use interest rate
futures widely to reduce their risk. The CBOT's Treasury bond
contract is the most widely used and highest volume of all futures.
The success of interest rate futures has led the futures exchanges
to look for other new products, including catastrophe insurance
futures
.
Catastrophe Insurance Futures
Several developments combined to encourage the CBOT to create
insurance futures. First, property-liability insurance companies,
despite controlling over $650 billion in assets (1992) , have very
minor participation in the futures markets. Insurance futures are
designed to get this industry more interested in investing in
futures, both insurance and other contracts. Second, the primary
method for property-liability insurance companies to reduce
underwriting risk is reinsurance. The unprecedented series of
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insured catastrophes in 1992 and the financial difficulties of
Lloyd's of London has seriously eroded the capacity of traditional
reinsurance sources. Insurance futures are an alternative device
for hedging insurance risk that could be especially helpful when
access to reinsurance markets is restricted. Also, the CBOT is
engaged in competition with other futures exchanges to develop and
market contracts. Trading volume in existing contracts has been
sluggish in recent years, leading all the exchanges to try to
develop innovative contracts to increase trading volume. Futures
contracts on a number of other unusual bases, including pollution
credits, fertilizer, the relationship between different foreign
currencies, frozen shrimp, and a stock index specifically on mid-
sized companies, are all being developed. Most new futures
contracts are likely to fail and be discontinued, but the potential
profits for the exchanges on successful new contracts fosters
continued new efforts.
The CBOT investigated establishing insurance futures on
automobile collision coverage, homeowners insurance and health
insurance before deciding to begin trading in the catastrophe
insurance futures. By basing the contract on catastrophic losses,
this contract had the advantages of being potentially more useful
to a wider selection of insurers. If properly structured the value
of the contract could be predicted based on historical catastrophe
losses, and the price of this contract would vary in line with the
most unpredictable of insured losses. Once the CBOT decided to
offer catastrophe insurance futures, the primary problem became on
what to base these contracts.
Selecting an Index for Catastrophe Futures
The price for a future based on a tangible commodity, such as
gold, corn, or heating oil, depends on the participants'
anticipated price of that commodity at the time the future
transaction is to occur. Sometimes that price is a function of the
current cost of the product loaded for the cost of storing the
commodity and foregone interest income on the funds used to acquire
the item. Thus, the price of gold futures is generally higher than
the current price of gold, as a futures trader could always buy
gold now and store it until the date when the futures contract
matures, but only by tying up his capital. For other commodities,
the price is based on anticipated supply and demand for the
commodity as of the future date. Grain futures prices are
generally lower for early fall months when harvests are expected to
increase the supply available for sale, depressing prices. In
either case, there is both a current price of the commodity, called
the spot price, and a price at the future date at which the seller
of the futures could then buy the commodity and deliver it to the
buyer of the futures to fulfill its obligation under the futures
contract. These commodity prices provide a basis for establishing
the price of the futures contract. However, there is no spot price
for catastrophic losses which can be used to establish catastrophe
insurance futures prices.
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Estimates of insured catastrophe losses are available on
individual catastrophes since 1949, as compiled by the Property
Claim Services division of American Insurance Services Group, Inc.
Unfortunately for insurance futures purposes, these are only
estimates made by PCS after surveys with a sample of insurers
shortly after each catastrophe. Since estimates of the size of
catastrophes could be subject to manipulation to benefit market
participants, the CBOT needed a verifiable source to use as the
basis of the new futures contract. The total of individual claims
paid on each catastrophe would serve as a perfect source of
catastrophe losses, but, again unfortunately for the purposes of
insurance futures, the coding of catastrophe numbers on claims was
discontinued by Insurance Services Office, the largest statistical
agency in the property-liability insurance business, in the late
1970s. Thus, in order to obtain verifiable values of losses in
line with catastrophe claims, the CBOT adopted an alternative index
to use in settling insurance futures contracts.
The CBOT contracted with ISO DATA to generate statistical
information on claims resulting from losses that tend to be
catastrophic in nature. Losses caused by wind, hail, earthquake,
riot and flood tend to be the result of catastrophic, rather than
individual, losses, and, thus, these causes of loss were selected
to be included in the index compilation. All losses coded with the
cause of loss codes listed in Table 1 which are reported to ISO by
companies included in the sample will be used to generate the
catastrophic loss total:
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TABLE 1:
Line Cause of Loss
Homeowners Wind and Hail
Commercial Multiperil Winds, Hail and Riot
Earthquake Earthquake
Fire Wind, Hail and, for Commercial Fire,
Riot
Allied Wind, Hail and, for Commercial Allied
Lines, Riot
Auto Physical Damage Wind, Hail, Earthquake, Riot, and Flood
Farmowners Wind, Hail and Riot
Commercial Inland Wind, Hail, Earthquake, Riot and Flood
Marine
The market share of the insurers included in the ISO sample
varies significantly by line and by state. For example, the sample
includes 60.5 percent of the industry's Commercial-Multiperil in
Wyoming, but only 2.3 percent of Wisconsin's Farmowners premium.
To develop an index value that approximates the industry's total
losses from a catastrophe, the losses reported to ISO are
multiplied by a factor (1/market share of sample insurers) on a by
line, by state basis. For example, if the total losses from wind,
hail and riot in Wyoming totaled $1 million for a particular
reporting period, then the value included in the index would be
$1,652,893 ($1,000,000 times 1/.605).
The index value used to settle catastrophe insurance futures
will thus be only an approximation of the catastrophe losses the
industry experiences. If insurers in the ISO sample are hit by a
particular disaster more heavily than the industry/ the index value
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will be an overestimate of industry losses. Conversely, if the
sample insurers are fortunate in a particular storm and have losses
below the level of the rest of the industry, the index value will
be an underestimate. Although this random variation could cause
problems for insurers in determining the proper use of catastrophe
insurance futures to hedge their own losses, it is unavoidable if
full detail on catastrophe losses for the industry is not
available.
Establishing a Futures Price
Catastrophe insurance futures are established for each quarter
of the year beginning with the fourth quarter of 1992. For each
quarter, four contracts are offered, for the entire country
(National) and for three subdivisions - Eastern, Midwestern and
Western. The date associated with each quarter is unnecessarily
confusing, because the quarter is dated by the cutoff month for
reporting a losses to ISO, which is three months after the end of
the actual calendar quarter when the loss was incurred. Thus, the
first contract is the March 1993 contract. This covers losses that
occur in the fourth quarter of 1992, from October 1 through
December 31. These losses must be reported to ISO by March 1993.
These contracts will trade until July 5, 1993, by which time ISO
DATA will have compiled the individual company loss reports and
calculated the total index value. At that time, any open futures
position will be settled at the indicated price. Unlike commodity
13
futures, no delivery of the underlying commodity can take place.
The final price at which catastrophe insurance futures will
settle is:
$25,000 x (Incurred Catastrophic Losses)/
(Estimated Property Premium)
ISO DATA will calculate and supply the value of incurred
catastrophic losses. This is the only value in the formula which
is unknown during the life of the contract. The denominator,
estimated property premium, is set by the CBOT before the futures
contract begins trading. This value is an estimate of all the
property insurance premiums, industry wide, for the geographic area
covered by the futures contract. These values represent the
premiums that are subject to catastrophic losses, excluding any
portion of a line's premium that covers liability or, for
automobile physical damage, collision. The premiums to be used for
all quarters from the fourth quarter of 1992 through the second
quarter of 1994 are listed in Table 2.
TABLE 2:
Contract: Estimated Property Premium
National $12,242,060,112
Eastern 5,718,769,160
Midwestern 3,968,805,577
Western 2,848,444,165
The regional numbers do not add to the National total because
Texas is included in both the Eastern and Midwestern contracts
Prices for futures contracts are quoted in percentage points.
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Thus, on the first day of trading, December 11, 1992, the price of
the March 1993 National Catastrophe Insurance futures contract of
8.0 (see Figure 1) meant that the cost of one insurance futures
contract cost $2,000 (8 x .01 times $25,000). This contract covers
losses occurring during the fourth quarter of 1992. This means
that the consensus estimate of expected catastrophic losses for the
fourth quarter of 1992 was $979,364,809, since:
$2,000 = $25,000 X ($979,364,809/$12,242,060,112)
By March 15, 1993, the price of that contract had increased to
$2550 (.102 x $25,000) , which meant that the estimate of losses had
increased to $1,248,690,131, since:
$2,550 = $25,000 X ($1, 248,690, 131/$12, 242 , 060, 112)
The increase in the estimated incurred losses was very likely
the result of the East Coast storm in December.
Actual CBOT Contract Trading
In this example, we will use the actual prices of catastrophe
futures contracts to explain the results of buying or selling a
futures contract. The futures prices were reported in the Wall
Street Journal for the first few weeks of trading; subsequent
prices were obtained directly from the CBOT. The Eastern contract
is more actively traded than the National contract, so we will use
that contract in our examples. In each case, we will use the
settlement price. The settlement price each day is normally the
daily close, and is used to mark the trader's position to market.
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The settlement price of 8.7 at the close of the first day's
trading translates into:
.087 = (Incurred Catastrophic Losses)/
(Estimated Property Premium)
Value of Contract = $25,000 X .087
= $2,175
In this example, we will present the results of buying one
contract rather than a more realistic hedge. Most companies would
probably need to buy hundreds of contracts to adequately hedge
their exposure to catastrophes. Trading is still so thin that an
attempt by a large company to purchase several hundred contracts
would significantly alter the price.
We assume initial margin to be $270 per contract, and
maintenance margin to be $200 per contract. Thus, for each
catastrophe insurance futures purchased, each trader, whether buyer
or seller, has to post $270 with his broker. Whenever the margin
account falls below $200 per contract, that trader must deposit
enough money to bring the balance back up to at least $270. These
margin requirements approximate values given in briefings by the
CBOT.
For each day, the settlement price is as given in the paper.
The total value of a contract is the settlement price times
$25,000. The daily gain or loss is the change in the settlement
price times $25,000. Total gain or loss is the cumulative sum of
the daily gain or loss.
In our example, the trader buys one futures contract on the
16
first day of trading, 12/11/92. He holds the position until
1/14/93, when he offsets it by selling one futures contract. The
broker requires a deposit of $270 before the position is
established. This deposit, plus any gains or losses, is returned
to the trader when the position is closed on 1/14/93.
In this example, the change in contract price between 12/11
and 1/14 gives a total gain of ( . 167-. 087) *$25, 000 or $2,000. Note
that the balance in the margin account is adjusted each day based
on the current price of the future: when the futures price rises,
a trader who has bought a future is credited with the change in the
price times $25,000; when it falls, the trader is debited by the
change in price times $25,000. A futures seller would have been
debited for a price rise and credited when the price falls, by the
same amounts
.
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TABLE 3:
EXAMPLE 1: March '93 Eastern Catastrophe Future
Date Settle
Price
(%)
Total
Value of
a
Contract
Change
in
Settle
Price
Daily
Gain or
Loss
Total
Gain or
Loss
Account
Balance
12/11 8.7 $2,175 $270
12/14 10.2 $2,550 1.5 $375 $375 $645
12/15 11.2 $2,800 1.0 $250 $625 $895
12/16 11.9 $2,975 0.7 $175 $800 $1,070
12/17 11.8 $2,950 -0.1 ($25) $775 $1,045
12/18 12.9 $3,225 1.1 $275 $1,050 $1,320
12/21 14.0 $3,500 1.1 $275 $1,325 $1,595
12/22 15.2 $3,800 1.2 $300 $1,625 $1,895
12/23 15.5 $3,875 0.3 $75 $1,700 $1,970
12/24 15.5 $3,875 0.0 $0 $1,700 $1,970
12/28 15.5 $3,875 0.0 $0 $1,700 $1,970
12/29 15.5 $3,875 0.0 $0 $1,700 $1,970
12/30 16.7 $4,175 1.2 $300 $2,000 $2,270
12/31 15.5 $3,875 -1.2 ($300) $1,700 $1,970
01/04 15.5 $3,875 0.0 $0 $1,700 $1,970
01/05 15.8 $3,950 0.3 $75 $1,775 $2,045
01/06 16.0 $4,000 0.2 $50 $1,825 $2,095
01/07 16.8 $4,200 0.8 $200 $2,025 $2,295
01/08 16.7 $4,175 -0.1 ($25) $2,000 $2,270
01/11 16.7 $4,175 0.0 $0 $2,000 $2,270
01/12 16.8 $4,200 0.1 $25 $2,025 $2,295
01/13 16.7 $4,175 -0.1 ($25) $2,000 $2,270
01/14 16.7 $4,175 0.0 $0 $2,000 $2,270
In our second example, the trader has worse luck. The trader
buys one contract on 1/18/93, and closes it out on 1/29/93. Since
there is no price change on the 19th, the margin account balance
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does not change. On the 2 0th, a price drop results in the trader
losing most of his brokerage account balance.
The $2 remaining is too low to protect the broker against
default risk. The broker will demand an additional deposit any
time the balance falls below the maintenance margin level, which we
will assume is $200. When the account balance falls below this
trigger level, the broker will demand that the trader deposit
sufficient funds to bring the total back up to the initial margin
level of $270. Thus, the trader has put up a total of $270 + 250
= $520; his account balance is now $270. The next day, the price
moves in our trader's favor, giving him an additional $250. This
brings the account balance up to $520. When the position is
closed, the account balance will be $395. The trader has deposited
$520. Thus, overall, the trader has made a $125 loss.
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TABLE 4:
EXAMPLE 2; March / 93 Eastern Catastrophe Future
Date Settle
Price
Total
Value of
a
Contract
Change
in
Settle
Price
Daily
Gain or
Loss
Total
Gain or
Loss
Account
Balance
(Close of
Day)
01/18
01/19
01/20
16.5
16.5
15.5
$4,125
$4,125
$3,875
0.0
-1.0
$0
($250)
$0
($250)
$270
$270
$20
Since the account balance is less than the maintenance margin
of $200, the investor will be required
t
jto bring the balance
back up to the initial margin level of $270, requiring a
further deposit of $250. The account balance the next morning
must be $270, or the position will be offset by the broker.
01/21 16.5 $4,125
01/22 16.0 $4,000
01/25 16.0 $4,000
01/26 15.8 $3,950
01/27 15.9 $3,975
01/28 16.1 $4,025
01/29 16.0 $4,000
1.0 $250 $0
0.5 ($125) ($125)
0.0 $0 ($125)
0.2 ($50) ($175)
0.1 $25 ($150)
0.2 $50 ($100)
0.1 ($25) ($125)
$520
$395
$395
$345
$370
$420
$395
When position is closed, the balance in the margin account
($395) is returned to the investor. The net loss on the
position is $270 initial margin + $250 cash infusion on the
morning of the 21st, minus $395, or $125.
Problems with the Catastrophe Contract
The first and greatest problem with catastrophe futures is
that very few of them are traded. Actively traded futures
contracts, such as the S&P500, provide extremely low transactions
costs and unparalleled liquidity. The catastrophe contract is not
yet actively traded. Many potential participants won't trade
because no-one else is trading.
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Most of the trading costs in a futures market result from the
price impact of a trade. As the contract builds up some volume,
the price impact of a given purchase or sale will decrease. This
will make the contract useful for more traders, which in turn will
increase the volume. Because of this positive feedback effect,
futures contracts are often either very liquid or very illiquid.
The second problem with insurance futures is that they are
standardized. No insurer's losses correlate perfectly with
national catastrophe losses. If the catastrophe futures price
moves by a different amount than the losses of an individual
insurer, the insurer's losses and gains will not exactly cancel.
This implies that the catastrophe future will not be the ideal
protection for everybody. However, it may give adequate protection
to a large number of insurers.
An additional problem is that there are no obvious catastrophe
futures sellers. Most insurers would be able to reduce their risk
by buying futures. For many of the most successful futures
contracts, there are both long and short hedgers. For instance,
for corn futures, a grain dealer would hedge by selling futures,
and a cereal manufacturer would hedge by buying futures. Not all
successful futures have balanced hedging demand; Treasury bond
futures, the most successful contract of all, has predominately
short hedging demand. We don't know that balanced hedging demand
is a necessary condition for contract success, but evidence from
the agricultural futures markets suggests that it helps.
Another potential problem with the contract is ensuring its
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financial integrity. Futures markets have a complex system by
which the exchange clearinghouse monitors and guarantees the
contracts against default. This system is designed to deal with
contracts for which the price fluctuates widely. The marking to
market system involves very large cash flows. This system
weathered the Crash of 1987 without breaking down. Could it also
have weathered Hurricane Andrew?
The CBOT has anticipated that there are some shocks which
could jeopardize the exchange guarantee system. In response, it
has limited the total contract value to $50,000 (which would occur
if the loss ratio in the index were 200 percent) . Hurrricane
Andrew would have triggered the cap on the Eastern contract, but
not the National contract. This cap, similar to coverage limits on
reinsurance, limits the protection insurance futures can provide.
In addition, there are limits on how much the price can move
in a day. These daily trading limits are intended to help the
system adjust to sudden changes in value. By spreading a large
price change over several days, they make it easier for
participants to deal with the cash flows involved in the mark-to-
market process. Since they frequently result in a trading halt,
they may also calm the market.
Comparison of Catastrophe Futures with Reinsurance
Insurance futures are claimed to provide insurers with an
alternative to reinsurance. As a result of a capacity shortage
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worldwide for reinsurance, and most notably for catastrophe
reinsurance, an acceptable substitute for reinsurance would be very
useful.
Reinsurance allows an insurer to reduce overall underwriting
risk by transferring some of the losses the insurer may experience
to the reinsurer. Quota and surplus share reinsurance provide for
the insurer and reinsurer to share premiums and losses
proportionally either on one overall percentage (quota) or
determined based on the size of the policy (surplus) . These forms
of reinsurance reduce the maximum loss the insurer can experience
on an individual risk and provide surplus relief for the insurer.
Non-proportional reinsurance focusses on large losses, with the
insurer covering losses up to the retention and the reinsurer
covering all or a significant portion of the excess. Excess of
loss reinsurance deals with individual losses. Aggregate excess,
or catastrophe reinsurance, provides coverage when any single
occurrence causes a loss to more than one policyholder that, in
aggregate, exceeds the retention. This coverage does not apply in
the event of a large loss to a single exposure, but applies when
more than one exposure incurs a loss from a common occurrence,
generally some form of catastrophe. Stop loss reinsurance provides
for the reinsurer to bear some portion, generally slightly less
than 100 percent, of all losses that cause the insurer to have a
loss ratio over a set value. This reinsurance provides coverage
regardless of the size of individual losses or whether a common
occurrence generated the losses.
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In addition to these traditional forms of reinsurance,
financial reinsurance has become a common method of risk shifting.
Financial reinsurance provides coverage similar to traditional
reinsurance, but limits the reinsurer's exposure to loss through
contract provisions that restrict the right of the insurer to
terminate the contract when the reinsurer has a cumulative loss on
the contract. However, recent accounting regulations, including
Financial Accounting Standards Board statement 113 and recent
rulings on funded catastrophe covers, are expected to impair the
effectiveness of this form of reinsurance.
Catastrophe insurance futures could provide a method for an
insurer to reduce risk, but in a manner that is quite different
from reinsurance. Assuming that an insurer would incur losses in
line with industry catastrophe experience, then when a catastrophe
increases the losses of the insurer, the price of the insurance
future will increase. The investment gain on the futures position
would offset the increase in incurred losses. Thus, purchasing
catastrophe insurance futures could reduce the overall operating
risk of an insurer. However, using futures would be very different
from using reinsurance. Reinsurance deals with an insurer's own
losses; the catastrophe insurance futures price is based on, in
essence, industry losses. Reinsurance reduces net premiums and
incurred losses on financial reports; futures would affect
investment income, not premiums and losses. Reinsurance
transactions take place between two parties that do, or should,
know each other; futures transactions are anonymous. Reinsurance
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transactions require developing individualized contracts that are
time consuming to prepare; futures are standardized and can be
executed immediately.
As a result of these distinctions, catastrophe insurance
futures would be a substitute for reinsurance only for large,
diversified insurers that do not require surplus relief, have a
book of business that is fairly evenly spread over the entire area
covered by the futures contract and not concentrated in any one
locality, and do not require the technical expertise of a
reinsurer. The ability to purchase futures without sharing
internal company data and to change the amount of coverage held
(futures contracts owned) quickly and anonymously could be an
advantage of futures over reinsurance.
Regulations
The regulations for property-liability insurers of most states
either are silent about futures or allow investment in futures to
fall under the miscellaneous category, which allows 5 to 10 percent
of surplus to be invested in these assets. Recent regulations in
New York specifically allow for investment in interest rate and
stock index futures to the extent this investment represents a bona
fide hedging strategy. Previously, New York regulations prohibited
investments in futures. This change should increase the use of
financial futures by property-liability insurers.
The only state that has enacted regulations regarding
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insurance futures is Illinois. The definition of the term
financial futures contract was expanded to include insurance
futures and there are specific requirements that any investment in
financial futures be established to hedge "price, valuation,
interest rate or... underwriting or insurance related risk."
The conservative nature of insurance regulation has served to
restrict the involvement of property-liability insurers in
financial futures of all types. Now that the CBOT is trading
futures specifically geared to insurance risk, regulators are
likely to pay more attention to the futures market and, eventually,
develop regulations that allow insurers to participate in these
markets to the extent that risk can be reduced. Thus, insurers
will have the opportunity to invest in catastrophe insurance
futures and other financial futures.
Conclusion
Catastrophe insurance futures are an interesting attempt by
the CBOT to provide insurers with an new method for shifting risk.
This innovation is being introduced at an opportune time, given
recent catastrophic losses and a reduced worldwide reinsurance
capacity. However, technical problems with the method of computing
the index to be used to settle these futures may limit insurer
interest. The index is not exactly catastrophe losses, but all
losses with selected natural hazard cause of loss codes, and the
value is determined by extrapolating industry exposure from a
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sample of insurers. Thus, no reliable historical record that is
comparable with the index values is available. Insurers are likely
to wait until a reasonable record of the index values is
established before deciding to use these insurance futures.
Unfortunately, the CBOT may not be able to continue to support
insurance futures that long. If an index value the closely
approximated the historical catastrophe record were used, then
interest might develop more quickly. One method for getting a more
accurate index value would be to reinstitute catastrophe codes on
loss reports to ISO and other statistical agencies. The rationale
for dropping this code, a limitation of the number of fields
available for coding, is no longer applicable. The availability of
reliable catastrophe loss data would be helpful to the industry for
a number of purposes, in addition to facilitating catastrophe
insurance futures. Planning and accounting for contingencies,
forecasting catastrophes, settling reinsurance contracts and
measuring industry exposure all could be done more accurately if
insurers coded losses for individual catastrophes.
The need for risk transfer tools will continue to grow for the
insurance industry. Catastrophe insurance futures are one response
to this need. Although these instruments' may not survive, the
interest that they have attracted and the knowledge about futures
markets in general that they have sparked may foster a greater
usage of other forms of financial futures by property-liability
insurers. This new investment opportunity could be a significant
benefit to both the futures exchanges, in new business, and the
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insurance industry, in a reduction in total operating risk
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